ABSTRACT In this paper, multi-hop cooperative techniques are adopted to improve the physical-layer security in 5G large-scale decode-and-forward relay networks with massive relays and eavesdroppers. The utilization of graph theory is investigated to relieve the burden of massive nodes and ease the cooperative antieavesdropping transmission designs. In particular, a secrecy weighted graph is first established according to the network topology. Three scenarios associated with different levels of wiretapping capability are taken into account. Accordingly, secrecy measurements are converted into the weight of each edge and three efficient cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies are then proposed for physical-layer security enhancement based on the shortest path algorithm, respectively. It is verified that the proposed cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies have the property of low complexity and are more attractive for large-scale networks. Simulation results highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of our designs. It has been shown that two-hop transmission does not always promise performance gain in terms of secrecy gain. On the contrary, the proposed strategies are able to provide considerable improvement for different cases, emphasizing the necessity of adopting multi-hop cooperative anti-eavesdropping techniques to improve the physical-layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to its ability to guarantee the secrecy of the physical layer, information-theoretic security has attracted lots of attention from the research community [1] - [4] . Particularly, cooperative transmission technique has recently emerged as an efficient approach to improve the physical-layer security of wireless communication networks, especially when the channel condition between the legitimate transceivers is poor [5] - [8] . During the cooperative communication process, cooperative nodes play the roles of the jammer or the relay nodes.
For jammer nodes, they are mainly responsible for injecting inference to the eavesdroppers [9] - [12] . In [9] , a new cooperative jamming was proposed for both Gaussian twoway and multi-access wiretap channels and the achievable secrecy sum rate was shown to be increased. In [10] , artificial noise was designed based on a stochastic geometry framework under slow fading channels to against randomly located eavesdroppers. The use of jamming process to improve physical-layer security was extended to peer-topeer (P2P) communications [11] , including device-to-device (D2D) communications [12] . However, such jamming process may also inject inference to the legitimate nodes and often requires to locate the jammer closer to the eavesdropper, which is hard to achieve in some practice scenarios. Additionally, It has been shown in [13] that the secrecy capacity is not necessarily increased with the help a jammer.
For relay nodes, their main mission is to forward the signal transmitted by the source with some collaborative techniques, such as relay selection and beamforming. Conventionally, opportunistic relay selection (ORS) was utilized as an effective way to improve the capacity of wireless networks [14] - [16] . Until recently, more and more authors have explored the application of ORS to secure communication and shown considerable secrecy performance gain [13] , [17] - [19] . In [13] , by taking all the possible source-relay and relay-destination links into consideration, a max-ratio relay selection policy was provided. In [17] , several optimal relay selection schemes against eavesdropping attack were given and compared to improve the wireless security. In [18] , security versus reliability analysis of the opportunistic relaying was investigated. Moreover, the security-reliability trade-off of relay selection was further studied in cognitive radio systems [19] . Alternatively, beamforming has been proved to be an efficient strategy to maximize the secrecy capacity [20] - [24] . In particular, cooperative nodes can act as a virtual multiple antenna system and optimize the relay-source weights (or the beamforming weights). Such distributed beamforming however is at the price of high overhead in implementation to achieve high coordination among source and relay nodes [13] .
Motivation: According to the analysis above, this paper mainly focuses on designing ORS criteria to improve the physical-layer security. In most existing literatures, only twohop cooperative transmission was adopted and the designs were based on the scenario of limited nodes. Note that the system could still suffer from low achievable secrecy performance if either of the channel conditions of source-relay link or relay-destination link is poor, which motivates the design of multi-hop cooperative transmission. Moreover, a largescale wiretap network with massive relays and eavesdroppers would be a more realistic scenario, since the exponential increase in connected devices in the fifth generation (5G) network, such as wirelessly accesses of billions of sensors, actuators and similar devices [25] , [26] . For multi-hop relay networks, more relay nodes need to be selected, which invalids existing two-hop strategies. Traversing down through all the possible relay permutations may lead to high complexity. Therefore, it deserves to investigate new cooperative antieavesdropping strategies with high efficiency.
With aforementioned motivations, this paper investigates how to improve the physical-layer security of 5G large-scale wireless multi-hop relay networks with massive relays and eavesdroppers. The contributions of our work are threefold, which can be summarized as follows:
• We abstract the network topology into an antieavesdropping weighted graph where the vertex set consists of the legitimate nodes and the edge set consists of the links between these nodes. Importantly, the weight of each edge is defined as a function of the channel state information (CSI) and the traffic requirement. Then the problem is translated into how to design the weight of each edge based on secure measurements. This conversion makes the cooperative anti-eavesdropping design concrete and figurative.
• Three scenarios are taken into consideration, which correspond to different levels of wiretapping capability. In particular, they are classified based on whether the eavesdroppers can cooperate with each other and whether the eavesdroppers can combine the wiretapped signals from each time slot. Accordingly, the weighted function of each scenario is carefully designed so that the shortest path algorithm (SPA) can be directly adopted to figure out an appropriate path.
• By introducing a secrecy gain threshold, we develop 'bad' relay (hop) elimination standards for the three scenarios, respectively. Those relays (hops) that fail to satisfy the standards will be eliminated before building the secrecy weighted graph, hence reducing the computational complexity. Finally, three efficient physicallayer security enhancement strategies are proposed, i.e., global-defense cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategy (GD-CAES), max-min cooperative antieavesdropping strategy (MM-CAES) and delay-aware cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategy (DA-CAES). Moreover, the proposed cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies are further extended to multi-user networks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model of this paper. In Section III, we convert the network into a weighted graph and propose three efficient cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies based on shortest path algorithm. In Section IV, we carry out the simulation results. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a wireless relaying network with a source A 1 , a destination A K , K − 2 legitimate (or friendly) relay nodes and M passive eavesdroppers. Every node is equipped with single antenna. The friendly node A k (k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , K −1}) helps to relay the signal transmitted by the source, while the eavesdropper E m (m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }) tries to intercept the information during any transmit slots. Every relay operates in half-duplex mode and using decodeand-forward (DF) protocols. The channel gain between A i and E m is denoted by g i,m , and the channel gain between A i and A j is denoted by h i,j , where i, j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , K − 1} and m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }.
Multi-hop relaying transmission is adopted in our design. For hop A i → A j , the transmit power of A i is denoted by P i,j , and the unit energy transmitted signal is denoted by x i . Then the received signal and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at A j are given by
where n i,j is the received additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with a variance of N 0 . We assume that the received SNR should satisfy γ i,j ≥ γ th , where γ th is the SNR threshold. Therefore, we set P i,j = γ th N 0 /|h i,j | 2 . Then, the capacity of link A i → A j is given by
Similarly, during the transmission, the instantaneous received SNR at E m is given by
We assume that the selected route is denoted as R, and r i,j ∈ R indicates that hop A i → A j is part of R. Thus, the total received SNR and capacity of the wiretap channel are given by
where f (x) denotes a function of variable x. where N is the number of hops. In this paper, our goal is to improve the secrecy gain, i.e., the ratio of legitimate rate to wiretap rate as follows
where (7) can directly indicate the relative relationship between legitimate rate to wiretap rate. 1
III. GRAPH THEORY BASED ANTI-EAVESDROPPING TECHNIQUES
Given γ th , C d is fixed. Therefore, finding an appropriate path that reduces the capacity of the wiretap channel is the key to increase the secrecy gain. In this section, we will introduce our approaches to the problem with the help of graph theory.
To find the optimal path for relaying, the most straightforward method is to figure out all the available paths from A 1 1 Conventionally, secrecy rate is adopted as secrecy metric, which is defined as C s
. However, secrecy rate may not illustrate very well the relative relationship between legitimate rate to wiretap rate for same cases. For example, C d R = 6.5, C e R = 6 and C d R = 0.6, C e R = 0.1. For both cases, C s R = 0.5. However, C d R ≈ C e R for the former, and C d R C e R for the later. Therefore, this paper use secrecy gain as our main goal. It will be shown in the simulation results later, the secrecy rate is also improved by apply our designs.
to A K and traverse down through all the paths selecting the path with maximum secrecy gain. We refer to this criterion as hard-working path selection (HW-PS).
Clearly, HW-PS is able to find out the best path from A 1 to A K . However, it needs to traverse down through all the available paths, hence significantly increasing the computational complexity, especially for large-scale networks. Given
(K −n)! possible paths may need to be checked, where n! denotes the factorial of a non-negative integer n.
A. SECRECY GRAPH FORMULATION
As mentioned above, the major disadvantage of HW-RS is its high computational complexity. Therefore, more efficient path selection criterion becomes an urgent need to be addressed. Since network topology can be abstracted into a graph, we pay our attention to the establishment of secrecy graph and look for appropriate graph algorithms for path selection. Firstly, the network is converted into a weighted graph G(V , E), where the vertex set consists of A k (k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K }) and the edge set consists of r i,j with weight of e ij . We use a simple example to illustrate how to build the secrecy graph. As shown in Fig. 2 , consider a wireless system with 4 relays and 4 eavesdroppers, where with
The secrecy graph is given by Fig. 3 and the adjacent matrix is presented in (10) . 
The value of e ij is the major problem remains to be solved in this paper. From Fig. 2 , we can see that the channel gain from A i to A j is the same to that from A j to A i if the reverse link also exists, i.e., |h i,j | 2 = |h j,i | 2 . However, this does not mean the weight of r i,j is equal to that of r j,i , i.e., e ij = e ji , since the weights are also affected by the channel gain from the relay candidates to the eavesdroppers. In this paper, e ij is defined as a function of |g i,m | 2 and |h i,j | 2 , where i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , K } and m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M }. In the sequel, we will carefully design the weighted functions according to three different scenarios. The main goal of the graph theory based anti-eavesdropping techniques is to select the path with minimum wiretap rate, i.e., C e R , so as to increase the secrecy gain.
B. COOPERATIVE ANTI-EAVESDROPPING STRATEGIES
In the sequence, three efficient cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies are proposed corresponding to different scenarios: (1) the eavesdropper is able to cooperate with each other and able to use max-ratio combining (MRC) scheme to combine the wiretapped signals of every time slot; (2) the eavesdropper is independent with each other but every eavesdropper is able to use MRC scheme to combine the wiretapped signals of every time slot; (3) the eavesdropper is independent from each other and unable to combine the wiretapped signals of every time slot. The differences among these three scenarios are also clearly marked in Table 1 .
1) SCENARIO 1: GLOBAL-DEFENSE COOPERATIVE ANTI-EAVESDROPPING STRATEGY (GD-CAES)
We first consider the worst scenario where all the eavesdroppers are able to cooperate with each other, hence forming a virtual multi-antenna system. And MRC scheme is used to combine the wiretapped signals of every time slot. Thus, the total received SNR (denoted as γ e R ) and capacity of the wiretap channel (denoted as C e R ) are respectively given by
In particular, the total wiretapped SNR for hop A i → A j is given by
Clearly, the total wiretapped SNR is straightforwardly a sum of the wiretapped SNR of all hops. Therefore, we set
then the total wiretapped SNR is equivalent to the path length of the selected path within the graph. As a result, the SPA can be adopted to figure out the optimal path with minimum wiretapped SNR. 2 To reduce the computational complexity, we eliminate 'bad' relay candidates by introducing additional threshold, denoted as G th , for secrecy gain. We assume that the secrecy gain should satisfy G s R ≥ G th , i.e., NC e R ≤ C d /G th .
Therefore, node i is eliminated if the following inequality holds
Proof: If relay A i is within the path and satisfies (15), then r i ,j 1 , r j 2 ,i ∈ R where i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , K − 1}, j 1 , j 2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K } and j 1 = i , j 2 = i , j 1 = j 2 . Therefore,
Proof end.
In conclusion, the graph based physical-layer security enhancement strategy can be summarized as follows: Use SPA to find the optimal path. We refer to this criterion as global-defense cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategy (GD-CAES). For the example in Fig. 2 , according to (14) and setting γ th = 1, we have
We set G th = 0dB, A 2 and A 3 are 'bad' relay candidates. After 'bad' relay elimination the adjacent matrix is given by
Applying SPA, we can obtain the path: A 1 → A 4 → A 6 , Path length: 0.9874 and secrecy gain:
2) SCENARIO 2: MAX-MIN COOPERATIVE ANTI-EAVESDROPPING STRATEGY (MM-CAES)
We consider a normal scenario where all the eavesdroppers are independent with each other. However, every eavesdropper is able to use MRC scheme to combine the wiretapped signals of every time slot. Thus, the total received SNR and capacity of the wiretap channel are respectively given by
Since all the eavesdroppers are unable to communicate with each other, the wiretapped SNR for hop A i → A j is given by 
Obviously, the wiretapped SNR for hop A i → A j can only be calculated after the path selection process. Then, we cannot simply set e ij = γ e i,j,M , since γ e i,j,M is unavailable before path slection. It is hard to set an optimal weight of each hop. Hence, we seek suboptimal weights for searching an appropriate path to relay the signal. From (20) we have,
Therefore, we use the upper bound of C e R as an approximate measurement to figure out the path. Particularly, we set
then the upper bound of the total wiretapped SNR is equivalent to the path length of the selected path within the graph. As a result, the SPA can be utilized to find out an appropriate path for relaying. Moreover, it is worth noting that the selected path may be a suboptimal one since only upper bound is used. Similar to scenario 1, we eliminate 'bad' relay candidates to reduce the computational complexity. Node i is eliminated, if one of the following inequalities holds
Proof: If node A i is within the selected path and satisfies (24a), i.e., r i ,j ∈ R, where i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , K − 1} , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K } and j = i . Then max As a result, max
Note that the proof of (24b) is omitted since it can be clarified in a similar way. Proof end.
In conclusion, the graph based physical-layer security enhancement strategy can be summarized as follows: 1) Calculate γ e i,j,m and eliminate 'bad' relay candidates based on (24); 2)
Build wiretap graph and set e ij = max 1≤m≤M γ e i,j,m ; 3)
Use SPA to find the optimal path. We refer to this criterion as max-min cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategy (MM-CAES). For the example in Fig. 2 , according to (23) and setting γ th = 1, we have
We set G th = 3dB, A 2 is 'bad' relay candidates. After 'bad' relay elimination, the adjacent matrix is given by
Applying the SPA, we can obtain the path: A 1 → A 4 → A 6 , Path length: 0.4496 and secrecy gain:
(27)
3) SCENARIO 3: DELAY-AWARE COOPERATIVE ANTI-EAVESDROPPING STRATEGY (DA-CAES)
We consider a better scenario where all the eavesdroppers are independent from each other and are unable to combine the wiretapped signals from every time slot. That is to say, the system wiretapped SNR is only determined by the worst hop. Thus, the total received SNR and capacity of the wiretap channel are respectively given by secrecy gain, end-to-end delay is an important measurement for multi-hop networks. Since every time slot is independent from each other in terms of the wiretap capacity, the selected path with minimum wiretap capacity may occupy more transmit hops. Therefore, we focus on how to select the path with minimum number of transmit hops while satisfying the secrecy gain threshold (G th ).
Firstly, use the same method as MM-CAES to eliminate the 'bad' relay candidates. Then, eliminate 'bad' hops if they satisfy the following inequality 
As a result,
Secondly, convert the network into a weighted graph G (V , E) , where e ij = 1. Finally, use the SPA to figure out the shortest path with minimum secrecy gain. When more than one path is obtained, select the one with minimum wiretap capacity.
In conclusion, the graph based physical-layer security enhancement strategy can be summarized as follows: 1) Calculate γ e i,j,m and eliminate 'bad' relay candidates and 'bad' hops based on (24) and (30), respectively; 2)
Build wiretap graph and set e ij = 1; 3)
Use SPA to find the optimal path. We refer to this criterion as delay-aware cooperative antieavesdropping strategy (DA-CAES). For the example in Fig. 2 , setting e ij = 1, we have
We set G th = 3dB, is 'bad' relay candidates, then after 'bad' relay candidates and 'bad' hops eliminations Fig. 3 reduces to Fig. 4 . The adjacent matrix is given by Applying the SPA, we can obtain the path: A 1 → A 4 → A 6 , Path length: 2 and secrecy gain:
(33)
C. EXTENSION TO MULTI-USER NETWORKS
The cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies are initially proposed to improve the physical-layer security for a single communication pair. Actually, our designs are able to manage the cooperative anti-eavesdropping transmission between every pair of legitimate nodes within the whole network. For example, the shortest path of every pair of vertexes can be achieved by simply adopting Floyd algorithm. Such property reveals the potential application of the proposed strategies to D2D networks. In this subsection, we consider multi-user networks. We assume that there are L user pairs that have the demand of communication. And during each communication phase, only one user pair is allowed to participate. For the three cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies, only the third step needs to be modified as: 3) Use SPA to find the optimal paths for each user pairs, then select the user pair with shortest path as the communication pair.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategy are examined by computer simulations. Without loss of generality, a twodimensional network topology is considered: K = 100 legitimate nodes and M = 4 passive eavesdroppers are randomly located at a square area with normalized coordinate, where a capture of the network topology is shown in Fig. 5 . For each simulation, all the nodes' locations and corresponding channel gains between them are randomly generated.
A. EFFICIENCY EXAMINATION
Note that all the proposed strategies are designed based on SPA of graph theory. Therefore, to illustrate the efficiency of the proposed strategies, Fig. 6 compares the complexity of the SPA and HM-PS. Note that the complexity of SPA is K 2 , where Dijkstra algorithm is adopted and K is the number of vertexes. As shown in Fig. 6 , the complexity of the proposed SPA is significantly lower than that of HM-RS, where the gap is remarkable when the number of relay candidates increases. Specifically, when K = 100, the complexity of HW-PS is up to 10 160 , while that of SPA remains low as 10 3 . The low-complexity property makes the proposed strategies more suitable for 5G large-scale networks. Moreover, to further reduce the complexity, 'bad' relay candidates eliminations are adopted in our designs. We take MM-CAES for example to illustrate the effect of such eliminations. Fig. 7 presents the network topology after 'bad' relay candidates eliminations. From Fig. 7 , we can see that the topology is relatively simplified, hence reducing the path selection complexity.
B. EFFECTIVENESS EXAMINATION
Three scenarios are taken into account in this paper, and three cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies (i.e., GD-CAES, MM-CAES and DA-CAES) are proposed, respectively. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed criterions, we compare them with direct transmission and two-hop transmission based on the secrecy gain with G th = 0dB. For the two-hop transmission, the relay is optimally selected among all the relay candidates to maximize the secrecy gain. The source node is located at (0, 0.5) and the destination node is located at (1, 0.5). 
1) SCENARIO 1
The average secrecy gain and secrecy rate under the proposed GD-CAES, direct transmission and two-hop transmission are presented by Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 , respectively. As shown in Fig. 8 , GD-CAES can obtained higher secrecy gain than other two criteria. For GD-CAES, positive secrecy gain is achieved, VOLUME 5, 2017 while those under the other two criteria remain negative. As can be seen in Fig. 9 , the secrecy rate is also significantly improved using our proposed GD-CAES. Both figures indicate that cooperative relaying has brought considerable performance improvement against direct transmission. However, the performance gain of two-hop cooperation is negligible compared with that of multi-hop cooperation, highlighting the effectiveness of the proposed GD-CAES.
2) SCENARIO 2
Similar to scenario 1, the average secrecy gain and secrecy rate under the proposed MM-CAES, direct transmission and two-hop transmission are presented by Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 , respectively. Both figures indicate that MM-CAES outperforms the other two criteria in view of secrecy gain and secrecy rate, and remarkable performance gain is obtained, again implying the effectiveness of the proposed multihop cooperative transmission. Moreover, the secrecy rate of scenario 2 is higher than that of scenario 1, since the eavesdroppers cannot cooperate with each other in scenario 2.
3) SCENARIO 3
Unlike previous two scenarios, the main goal in scenario 3 is to reduce the transmit hops while satisfying the secrecy gain threshold. Similarly, Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 
V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the issue of how to efficiently improve the physical-layer security of 5G large-scale relay networks with the help of graph theory. To this end, the network topology is first abstracted into an anti-eavesdropping weighted graph. Three scenarios corresponding to different levels of wiretap capability are taken into consideration, respectively. Accordingly, based on SPA, three efficient multi-hop cooperative anti-eavesdropping strategies are then proposed to enhance the physical-layer security. Simulation results indicate that the proposed strategies can significantly reduce the complexity of path selection, where the gap is remarkable when the number of relay candidates increases. The lowcomplexity property makes the proposed strategies more suitable for 5G large-scale networks. It has also been shown that all the three strategies can achieve higher secrecy gain than direct transmission and two-hop transmission. Particularly, the secrecy rate is also improved. Conventionally, it is believed that relay cooperation can bring considerable performance improvement and two-hop transmission is always adopted for granted. However, our results reveal that such relaying approach may lead to poor performance in some cases, highlighting the importance of addressing multi-hop cooperation by utilizing the proposed anti-eavesdropping strategies in view of physical-layer security. It is worth noting that how the CSI is gathered in the distributed relay scenario is also one important work to pursue, we will present our results in our future publications. ZEYU XIA is currently pursuing the B.S. degree with the School of Telecommunications Engineering, Xidian University. His research interests include cooperative communications, physical layer security, and mathematical modeling and programming.
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